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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1969 the real value of a federal judge’s salary has declined.1  
Meanwhile, profits per partner at prominent law firms have skyrock-
eted.2  Chief Justice John Roberts has highlighted this development, 
along with problems retaining and recruiting federal judges from the 
private sector, and concluded that Congress’s failure to raise judicial 
pay has “reached the level of a constitutional crisis that threatens to 
undermine the strength and independence of the federal Judiciary.”3 
This Comment analyzes the crisis that Chief Justice Roberts has 
identified.  In particular, this Comment focuses on the link between 
judicial pay and ideology.  After marshalling data from the judicial con-
firmation process over the past thirty years, this Comment finds that low 
judicial pay has helped create a more ideologically polarized bench. 
Part I explores Chief Justice Roberts’s argument that, as a result of 
stagnant judicial compensation, the quality and independence of the 
judiciary are in jeopardy.4  Part II analyzes the only empirical study to 
date on the link between pay and performance in the federal judi-
ciary.  That study, authored by Professor Scott Baker, concludes that the 
modern level of judicial pay has not, in any quantifiable sense, affected 
the quality of the judiciary.5  However, the study contains evidence that 
low pay may be undermining the independence of the judiciary by at-
tracting more ideologically driven judges in major markets.  Judges 
from the top five legal markets (Top Five Markets)—New York, Los An-
geles, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.6—tend to exhibit 
more partisan voting patterns and citation practices.7  Thus, the study 
 
1 See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 1-2 [he-
reinafter Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/ 
2007-01/2006/index.html (noting that the real value of a federal district judge’s salary 
has dropped 23.9% since 1969).   
2 See Christopher Zorn et al., Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. REV. 829, 837 fig.1 
(2008) (showing that between 1983 and 2003 average profits per partner at the fifty 
highest-grossing American law firms more than tripled). 
3 Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 1. 
4 Id.  
5 See Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?,  88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 66 
(2008) (testing Chief Justice Roberts’s claims regarding the salary gap between the ju-
diciary and the private sector by examining the effect of low judicial pay on “quantifia-
ble measures of judicial performance”).  
6 See id. at 89 (identifying these cities as the “top-five legal markets”). 
7 See Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 834 & tbl.1 (reexamining Baker’s data and finding 
empirical evidence of greater partisan judicial behavior in Top Five Markets); see also 
Scott Baker, Refining the Judicial Salary/Judicial Performance Debate:  A Response to Professors 
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suggests that judges who, generally speaking, forgo the most income to 
join the bench may be more ideological than their peers.8 
Part III presents new data and a model to support the view that 
the failure to raise judicial pay has, in major markets, created a more 
ideologically driven judiciary.  This Comment focuses on the amount 
of time it takes a judicial nominee to be confirmed.  Over the past 
thirty years, the Senate has taken significantly longer to confirm no-
minees from Top Five Markets than those from smaller markets.9  In 
other words, the Senate takes longer to confirm the nominees who, 
on average, pass up the most staggering salaries to become judges.10  
This finding is statistically significant.11  After controlling for other 
plausible explanations, this Comment concludes that the best expla-
nation for the longer confirmation times is that, as a result of low 
judicial pay, nominees from major markets tend to be more ideologi-
cal than their peers.12 
One implication is clear:  increasing judicial pay in major markets 
should diminish partisan voting on the bench.13  To ensure that our 
judiciary remains fair-minded and independent, Congress should 
swiftly pass legislation providing robust cost-of-living adjustments for 
judges in large cities.14  In addition, Congress should ensure that judi-
 
Cross, Czarnezki, Henderson, Marks, and Zorn, 88 B.U. L. REV. 855, 863-64, 868 (2008) (ac-
knowledging that Baker’s data reveal “partisan voting among judges in top-five markets”). 
8 See Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 835 (“[L]ower judicial salaries in Top Five mar-
kets strongly correlate with behavior Baker characterizes as ‘ideological’ or ‘influence-
motivated.’”); id. at 839 (“In Omaha, the salary disparity between a law firm partner 
and a federal judge is likely to be a factor of two.  But in New York City or Washington, 
D.C., it could easily be a tenfold gap.”). 
9 See infra Section III.C (comparing confirmation times for judges from Top Five 
Markets and small markets). 
10 See supra note 8.  This Comment assumes that judges from Top Five Markets 
could have earned considerably more income than their counterparts from smaller 
markets.  This assumption is solidly grounded in regional average-compensation fig-
ures, see infra Section II.B, but it is not particularized to individual judges. 
11 The results are statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level.  For a discussion of 
the varying levels of statistical significance and their meanings, see infra note 115. 
12 See infra Sections III.D-F (providing a statistical model that, while controlling for 
a number of alternative explanations, still finds a statistically significant relationship 
between longer confirmation times and nominees from Top Five Markets). 
13 See Baker, supra note 7, at 868 (acknowledging that Zorn et al.’s analysis of Bak-
er’s study leads to the conclusion that “higher salaries could diminish partisan voting 
among judges in top-five markets”). 
14 See id. (recognizing that these results may support cost-of-living increases); see 
also KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JUDICIAL SALARY 30 (2007) (“Federal 
judges have, since 1891, been paid the same salaries regardless of the location of their 
chambers or residences.”). 
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cial pay keeps pace with inflation.15  Finally, in view of the demonstra-
ble effects of low judicial salaries, Congress should seriously consider 
Chief Justice Roberts’s pleas on behalf of his colleagues for a judicial 
pay raise. 
I.  THE CRISIS 
Chief Justice Roberts regularly emphasizes the need for an in-
crease in judicial pay.16  However, he offered his most forceful and 
comprehensive argument in his 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judi-
ciary.  In this report, the Chief Justice focused on just one issue:  Con-
gress’s perennial failure to raise judicial pay.17  According to Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, this issue has developed into a “constitutional crisis” that 
“threatens to undermine the strength and independence of the feder-
al Judiciary.”18 
Chief Justice Roberts begins by pointing to the decline in federal 
judicial salaries.  From 1969 to 2006, the average U.S. worker’s wage, 
adjusted for inflation, rose 17.8%.19  During that same period, infla-
tion-adjusted federal judicial pay declined 23.9%—leaving a 41.7% 
gap.20  Indeed, in 1969, a federal district judge earned 21% more than 
 
15 See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2008 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
THIRD BRANCH, (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 3 [herei-
nafter Roberts, 2008 Year-End Report], available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov 
/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf (pointing out that Congress has not 
increased judicial pay to keep pace with inflation). 
16 Chief Justice Roberts has made a plea for a pay raise each year since being ap-
pointed and raised to Chief Justice.  See Posting of Jess Bravin to WSJ.com Washington 
Wire, Chief Justice Roberts’s Annual Appeal, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/12 
/31/chief-justice-robertss-case-for-a-raise (Dec. 31, 2008) (“The Supreme Court faces a 
lot of tough questions, but for Chief Justice John Roberts, one of the hardest comes 
each December, when he files the Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary:  How will 
he style his annual appeal for a judicial pay raise?”). 
17 Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 1. 
18 Id.  A chorus of voices in the legal community echoes Chief Justice Roberts’s 
warnings.  See Baker, supra note 5, at 65 (pointing out that “prominent law school 
deans, the American Bar Association, and leading members of the corporate bar” have 
all endorsed Chief Justice Roberts’s position).  But see Dahlia Lithwick, O Mighty Crisis, 
SLATE, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2156781 (asserting that many pundits 
find Chief Justice Roberts’s claim, that the current level of judicial pay could precipi-
tate a “constitutional crisis,” outrageous).   
19 See Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
20 Id.  But see Posting of Ben Winograd to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Judicial 
Pay—Are Judges Being Selective with the Evidence?, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/ 
02/15/judicial-pay-are-judges-being-selective-with-the-evidence/ (Jan. 15, 2007) (point-
ing out that 1969 stands out as the year when judges received their highest inflation-
adjusted wages and that, in reality, judicial pay has only slightly lagged behind its me-
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deans at top law schools and 43% more than senior professors at those 
schools.21  Today, Chief Justice Roberts writes, federal district judges 
earn about half what such deans and professors are paid.22 
There is an even starker contrast between a judge’s salary and pay 
at private law firms.  Chief Justice Roberts writes, “Beginning lawyers 
fresh out of law school in some cities will earn more in their first year 
than the most experienced federal district judges before whom those 
lawyers hope to practice some day.”23  Indeed, in 2008, a federal dis-
trict judge earned $169,300, while a federal circuit judge earned 
$179,500.24  By contrast, a first-year associate at a top firm in one of the 
largest cities earned around $160,000.25  With bonuses, many of these 
rookie lawyers earned more than the distinguished members of the 
bench.26  Moreover, judicial pay pales in comparison to the compensa-
tion that partners at top firms receive.  In 2008, the average profits per 
equity partner at the 100 highest-grossing American law firms (the 
“Am Law 100”), figures that are reported annually in The American 
Lawyer, stood at an astounding $1.26 million—vastly greater than the 
salary that federal judges earn.27 
Chief Justice Roberts argues that this drastic discrepancy in pay 
between the private and public sectors has created recruitment and 
retention problems for the federal judiciary.  He points out that fewer 
judges are entering the federal judiciary from the private sector.28  
During the Eisenhower Administration, around sixty-five percent of 
 
dian real value from 1969 to 2006).  Regardless, Chief Justice Roberts is certainly cor-
rect in pointing out the vast discrepancy between current judicial salaries and the 
compensation paid to prominent legal professionals in the private sector. 
21 See Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 1. 
22 Id. at 2; see also SCOTT, supra note 14, at 25 (showing that salaries for the deans 
and senior professors of the twenty-five highest-ranked law schools have greatly out-
paced judicial pay). 
23 Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
24 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Salaries Since 1968, http://www.us 
courts.gov/salarychart.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
25 See generally NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2009–2010 NALP DIRECTORY OF 
LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2009) (providing a directory of legal employers’ compensation in-
formation). 
26 In 2008, Cravath, Swaine & Moore set the market rate for first-year associate bo-
nuses at $17,500 for major New York City law firms.  See Nate Raymond, Cravath An-
nounces Reduced Bonuses for Junior Lawyers, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 4, 2009, at 4, 
available at 2009 WLNR 22015100.  Prior to the economic downturn, in 2007, Cravath 
had set the market rate at $35,000.  Id. 
27 See Aric Press & John O’Connor, Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May 2009, 
at 107.   
28 See Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
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federal judges came from private practice.29  In modern times, less 
than forty percent come from the practicing bar.30  Additionally, a 
greater number of judges are retiring from the bench early to return 
to private practice.31  In the 1960s, only a handful of federal judges re-
signed or retired,32 but from 1990 to 2005, ninety-two judges stepped 
down—fifty-nine of them to return to private practice.33 
Chief Justice Roberts contends that these developments, caused by 
inadequate judicial pay, undermine two hallmarks of the judiciary:  
“[W]ithout fair judicial compensation we cannot preserve the quality 
and independence of our Judiciary, which is the model for the world.”34  
Chief Justice Roberts argues that the drastic decline in judicial com-
pensation, as compared to the compensation available through other 
opportunities in the legal profession, will inevitably detract from the 
quality of candidates for the federal bench.35  The judiciary, according 
to Chief Justice Roberts, will soon be restricted to “(1) persons so 
wealthy that they can afford to be indifferent to the level of judicial 
compensation, or (2) people for whom the judicial salary represents a 
pay increase.”36  Either way, he maintains, the judiciary will not be a 
strong and distinguished group—the type of bulwark this nation has 
long relied upon to protect the rule of law.37 
Chief Justice Roberts then explains how inadequate compensation 
threatens the independence of the judiciary.  He notes that low judicial 
pay undermines the viability of life tenure.38  Without life tenure, 
Chief Justice Roberts contends, judges will not as easily be able to 
make the unpopular decisions that upholding the rule of law occasio-
 
29 Id.  But see SCOTT, supra note 14, at 6-8 & fig.1 (arguing that the decline in re-
cruitment from the private sector is not quite as steep as Chief Justice Roberts claims). 
30 See Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 2 (warning that the decline in 
the percentage of judges drawn from private practice will change the nature of the 
federal judiciary). 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2005 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 2006, at 2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan06 
ttb/yearend.  
33 Id.  
34 Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 3 (emphases added). 
35 See id. (“The dramatic erosion of judicial compensation will inevitably result in a 
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nally requires.39  Chief Justice Roberts writes, “If judicial appointment 
ceases to be the capstone of a distinguished career and instead be-
comes a stepping stone to a lucrative position in private practice, the 
Framers’ goal of a truly independent Judiciary will be placed in se-
rious jeopardy.”40 
This Comment focuses on Chief Justice Roberts’s second concern:  
that low judicial pay undermines the independence of the judiciary.  
However, this Comment does not assess whether, as the Chief Justice 
predicts, judges will become compromised by an ambition to return to 
private practice.  Rather, this Comment evaluates a different threat to 
the independence of the judiciary:  whether low judicial pay attracts 
more ideologically driven judges.  Indeed, a partner at a top firm in a 
major market must have some meaningful motivation to accept a dras-
tic pay cut—perhaps as high as eighty or ninety percent—to take a 
seat on the federal bench.41  Of course, a lawyer may be motivated to 
accept a nomination for a variety of reasons:  prestige, better hours, 
more interesting work, and so on.42  This Comment, however, explores 
the possibility that, as a result of low judicial pay, a nominee’s ideology 
often supplies more motivation than it otherwise would. 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  Michael Luttig and Paul Cassell are two of the most prominent circuit 
judges who have recently left the bench for lucrative positions in the private sector.  See 
Jerry Markon, Appeals Court Judge Leaves Life Appointment for Boeing, WASH. POST, May 
11, 2006, at A11 (“Friends of Luttig said yesterday that the financial lure of the Boeing 
job and the greater ability to pay for his children’s college education—Luttig has a 14-
year-old daughter and a 10-year-old son—were key to his resignation.”).  Paul Cassell 
gave similar reasons for his departure from the bench:  
I would like to ensure that my children will have the same educational oppor-
tunities that I had.  How to achieve that within the constraints on current 
judicial pay is more than a difficult task.  My wife and I have concluded that 
we may not be able to do what we have always planned to do unless I make 
some changes. 
Posting of Peter Lattman to the Wall Street Journal Law Blog, Judge Paul Cassell Re-
signs, Bemoaning Judicial Pay, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/21/judge-paul-
cassell-resigning (Sept. 21, 2007).  
41 For instance, to accept a position on a federal circuit court, the average equity 
partner at Kirkland & Ellis, a prominent firm based in Chicago, would have to trade 
$2.47 million in profits for a $179,500 salary.  See Susan Beck, Kirkland Revenue Up 7%, 
Profits Flat at $2.47m, LEGAL WEEK, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-
week/news/1169810/kirkland-revenue-profits-flat-usd2-27m#; see also Zorn et al., supra 
note 2, at 839 (“For 2005, the 90th percentile profits per partner of an Am Law 200 firm 
headquartered in a Top Five market is $2 million per year . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
42 See Baker, supra note 5, at 72 (discussing the nonpecuniary benefits of judgeship 
and arguing that salary is only “one component of the total compensation package”). 
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II.  THE LITERATURE 
In 2008, Professor Scott Baker published the only empirical analy-
sis to date evaluating the link between the pay and the performance of 
the federal judiciary.43  He analyzed whether the current level of pay 
has, in any quantifiable sense, detracted from the quality of the judi-
ciary’s performance.  He found that the financial opportunity44 that a 
nominee foregoes usually has no bearing on a judge’s work ethic45 or 
the quality of a judge’s opinions.46  As such, Baker concluded that the 
current level of pay has not detracted from the judiciary’s quality in 
any measurable sense.47  This Comment, however, questions whether 
the current level of pay has affected the level of partisanship on the 
federal bench.  With respect to that connection, Baker’s data tell a dif-
ferent story. 
A.  Baker’s Initial Data on Pay and Ideology 
Initially, Professor Baker found that the current level of judicial 
pay has not led to the appointment of more ideological judges.48  He 
measured a judge’s commitment to ideology in two ways.  First, he 
analyzed a judge’s voting patterns in controversial cases.49  Using data 
 
43 Id. at 66.  There are, of course, inherent limitations in attempting to quantify 
intangibles such as the quality and independence of the federal judiciary.  See Frank B. 
Cross, Perhaps We Should Pay Federal Circuit Judges More, 88 B.U. L. REV. 815, 817 (2008) 
(questioning whether Professor Baker’s wage-economics analysis can properly be used 
to analyze the federal judiciary).  But see Stephen Marks, A Comment on the Relationship 
Between Judicial Salary and Judicial Quality, 88 B.U. L. REV. 843, 843 (2008) (remarking 
on “the sophistication and creativity of [Baker’s] statistical analysis in the face of for-
midable evidentiary problems”); Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 829 (pointing to the “in-
genuity of [Baker’s] research design” and expressing appreciation for his initiation of 
an empirical literature on this issue). 
44 Baker measured a judge’s opportunity cost as the difference between a judge’s 
salary and his next-best financial opportunity—partnership in a regional law firm.  
Baker, supra note 5, at 78. 
45 Baker measured work ethic by examining dissent rates in controversial cases 
and how long it takes judges to file published opinions after hearing oral arguments.  
Id. at 98-105. 
46  Baker measured the quality of a judge’s opinions by citation count.  Id. at 105-
06 & n.128. 
47 See id. at 112 (noting that although low judicial salaries may erect a barrier be-
fore the bench for some candidates, plenty of eminently qualified lawyers remain will-
ing to accept a nomination). 
48 See id. at 85-97 (“[T]here is little evidence that low judicial salaries result in a 
judiciary more prone to ideological thinking.”). 
49 Id. at 86-94.  Controversial cases include   
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from the Chicago Judges Project,50 he tracked the extent to which Re-
publican-appointed judges voted in a conservative fashion in contro-
versial cases; for Democrat-appointed judges, he measured their ten-
dency to vote for the more liberal outcome.51  Second, he analyzed a 
judge’s citation practices by examining the extent to which judges 
nominated by one party would only cite judges nominated by their 
own party.52 
Having established a judge’s commitment to ideology in these two 
ways, Baker then compared this figure with the opportunity cost the 
judge absorbed to take a seat on the federal bench.53  The opportunity 
cost for a judicial nominee is the income he would have received from 
his next-best employment opportunity—partnership at a private law 
firm—over the rest of his career.54  Controlling for region and age, 
Baker calculated the opportunity cost for each of the federal circuit 
judges nominated between 1974 and 2004.55  Upon comparing these 
 
[a]bortion, capital punishment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, criminal 
appeals, takings, the Contracts Clause, affirmative action, Title VII race dis-
crimination cases brought by African-American plaintiffs, sex discrimination, 
campaign finance, cases in which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil, 
industry challenges to environmental regulations, and federalism challenges 
to congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause.   
Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological 
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals:  A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 311-13 
(2004)). 
50 Id.  The Chicago Judges Project is a compilation of 4958 decisions in the federal 
circuit courts used in an earlier study on judicial voting patterns.  See id.  Though no 
longer publicly available, the project’s database categorizes the decisions according to 
a variety of factors and then labels each decision as conservative or liberal.  See Cass 
Sunstein, Audio Recording:  The Chicago Judges Project (Sept. 16, 2004), transcript 
available at http://research.uchicago.edu/highlights/show_transcript.php?id=23. 
51 See Baker, supra note 5, at 86 (“Although the labels are imprecise, they do track 
common notions of liberal and conservative jurisprudence.  For example, a liberal vote 
in a sex discrimination case is a vote for the employee; a conservative vote is a vote for 
the employer.”). 
52 See id. at 95-97 (noting that judges tend to cite judges from the same political 
party in “hot button” cases). 
53 See id. at 89-97 (considering factors such as age, prior experience, and location 
to determine a judge’s lost opportunity cost). 
54 Id. at 78. 
55 The above explanation captures the essence of Professor Baker’s opportunity-
cost calculation.  However, the actual methodology was far more complex: 
The lost wages calculation for a person considering the bench consists of eight 
steps.  First, calculate, at the time of the appointment, the number of years the 
candidate would likely remain at the law firm if they did not take the judge-
ship.  Second, determine the likely law firm compensation for each of those 
years, considering increasing compensation due to increased seniority in the 
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opportunity costs with each judge’s commitment to ideology, Baker 
found that the current level of judicial pay has no measurable effect 
on the extent to which a judge is ideologically disposed in her deci-
sionmaking.56 
B.  Criticism and Correction 
Three professors jointly responded to Baker’s article, showing that 
judges from the Top Five Markets—that is, the judges who on average 
passed up the most lucrative financial opportunities—tend to cast 
more partisan votes in controversial cases and tend to exhibit more 
partisan citation practices than their counterparts from smaller mar-
kets.57  In their analysis of Baker’s models, Professors Christopher 
Zorn, William Henderson, and Jason Czarnezki noticed that Baker did 
not adequately control for the enormous profits per partner in New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.58  
Although Professor Baker had attempted to control for these profits, 
he relied on profit-per-partner figures from average regional firms 
around these markets.59  As the professors put it, however, “[I]f federal 
judges are truly drawn from ‘the Nation’s very best lawyers,’ it is likely 
that average compensation figures for regional law firm partnerships 
understate the potential lost earnings, particularly in the nation’s 
largest and most lucrative legal markets.”60  Bearing this in mind, the 
professors themselves used profits-per-partner figures from the fifty 
 
firm.  Third, estimate how much law firm compensation in general is likely to 
increase during that time.  Fourth, discount the total amount back to present 
value using the real discount rate.  Fifth, estimate the anticipated judicial wage 
for the number of years of expected service on the bench and discount this 
amount back to present value.  Sixth, to get the net cost of taking the judge-
ship—the financial sacrifice made—subtract the present value of the antic-
ipated judicial salary from the present value of the lost law firm wages.  Se-
venth, adjust this net sacrifice for geographic cost of living differences, 
revealing, in effect, the purchasing power of the wages forgone.  Finally, place 
that lost purchasing power into constant dollars, enabling the comparison of 
the financial sacrifices made by judges appointed at different times. 
Id. at 79. 
56 See id. at 94 (finding that the “empirical evidence suggests that low pay does not 
lead to the appointment of more partisan judges”). 
57 See Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 835 (“[J]udges in Top Five legal markets appear 
willing to trade pecuniary benefits for some measure of legal or policy influ-
ence . . . .”).  
58 See id. at 830 (“The purpose of this Reply is to qualify Baker’s interpretation of 
his results, at least with regard to judges located in the ‘Top Five’ legal markets . . . .”). 
59 See Baker, supra note 5, at 91. 
60 Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 836. 
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highest-grossing American firms, as well as the salaries of leading gen-
eral-counsel positions, to calculate opportunity costs for nominees 
from Top Five Markets.61 
The professors then reran Baker’s models and found that judges 
from Top Five Markets—the judges who passed up the largest poten-
tial profits—were, to a statistically relevant degree, more motivated by 
ideology than their peers from smaller markets.  “Specifically,” they 
wrote, “the lower judicial salaries in Top Five Markets strongly corre-
late with behavior Baker characterizes as ‘ideological’ or ‘influence-
motivated.’”62 
Professor Baker graciously accepted this criticism and acknowl-
edged that, for judges from Top Five Markets, the low level of judicial 
pay strongly coincides with an increase in ideologically motivated be-
havior from the bench.63  Baker wrote, “Most dramatically, [Professors 
Zorn, Henderson, and Czarnezki] identify that higher salaries could 
diminish partisan voting among judges in top-five markets.  This result 
is a welcome refinement to the article.”64  Nevertheless, Baker main-
tains that this result does not vindicate proposals for across-the-board 
increases in federal judicial pay.65  Rather, he says, it “might be used to 
support more aggressive [cost-of-living] adjustments for judges in ma-
jor markets—a proposal Judge Richard Posner has been advocating 
for a number of years.”66 
III.  JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION DATA 
New data support the view that, in major markets, inadequate 
compensation tends to attract more partisan nominees to the federal 
bench.  From 1977 to 2008, the Senate has, on average, taken signifi-
cantly longer to confirm nominees from Top Five Markets—nominees 
who, generally speaking, pass up the most lucrative financial oppor-
tunities to become federal judges.  The best explanation for this phe-
 
61 See id. at 836-39 (noting that, in 2005, the ninetieth-percentile profits-per-
partner of an Am Law 200 firm headquartered in a Top Five Market stood at $2 mil-
lion per year, as compared to $935,000 per year for non–Top Five Markets and 
$588,666 per year for a national sample). 
62 Id. at 830. 
63 See Baker, supra note 7, at 868. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 171-72 (2008) (arguing that 
cost-of-living increases will do more to retain top talent in the federal judiciary than 
intermittent large raises). 
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nomenon appears to be that, as a result of inadequate compensation, 
nominees from Top Five Markets are generally more ideological than 
their counterparts from smaller markets. 
This Part begins with a brief overview of the judicial confirmation 
process.  Next, this Part presents data on circuit court nominations 
from President Jimmy Carter through President George W. Bush.67  
Specifically, the analysis compares the length of time taken to confirm 
each nominee from a Top Five Market with the time taken to confirm 
each nominee from a smaller market.  On average, and under every 
President but one, nominees from Top Five Markets wait significantly 
longer to be confirmed.  This result holds regardless of the relation-
ship between the nominating President and the Senate. 
This Part concludes by considering potential explanations for 
these longer confirmation times.  Upon close scrutiny, they cannot be 
accounted for by (1) mere coincidence, (2) the quality of the nomi-
nees, or (3) the influence of the circuits on which the nominees 
would sit.  Rather, the best explanation appears to be that these no-
minees hold stronger ideological positions than their peers.  Inade-
quate compensation, it seems, attracts more partisan judges. 
A.  Confirmation Process for Circuit Courts 
Before examining the data, a brief overview of the confirmation 
process is in order.  Under the Constitution, the process for appoint-
ing federal circuit court judges requires presidential nomination and 
then confirmation by the Senate.68  The President initiates the process 
by selecting a potential judge and then submitting that nomination to 
 
67 See infra Appendix 1 for the entire database.  The analysis begins with the Cart-
er presidency for three reasons.  First, using this starting point creates a sufficient data 
set for purposes of statistical significance.  Second, including the Carter presidency 
helps balance the ratio of Democratic to Republican eras (2:3).  Finally, a prior analysis 
of confirmation data focused on 1977 to 2003, and that study provides a useful com-
parison at certain points.  See generally DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MITCHEL A. 
SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS:  U.S. 
DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS, 1977–2003 (2004). 
68 The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein other-
wise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 
2.  The Constitution further provides that the “judicial Power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”  Id. art. III, § 1.  The Article III courts that this 
Comment focuses on are the U.S. courts of appeals, the U.S. district courts, and the 
U.S. Court of International Trade.   
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the Senate.69  Next, the Senate Judiciary Committee holds a hearing 
on the nomination and votes on whether to report the nomination to 
the full Senate.70  If the Committee elects to report the nomination, 
the entire Senate typically votes by a simple majority to confirm or dis-
approve the nomination.71 
A nomination, however, can be defeated at various points before it 
ever receives a full Senate vote.  The Judiciary Committee can thwart 
the nomination in three ways:  (1) by refusing to hold a hearing on 
the nomination, (2) by declining to vote on whether to report it to the 
Senate, or (3) by voting against reporting it to the entire Senate.72  If 
the nomination survives the Judiciary Committee, the nominee usually 
receives an up-or-down vote by the full Senate.  Under Senate rules, 
however, Senators opposing the nomination have one last chance to 
block the vote.  They can filibuster the nomination and block the vote, 
unless three-fifths of the Senate votes to close debate on the nomi-
nation.73  If, for any of these reasons, a nomination fails to receive a 
full Senate vote, the nomination is either returned to, or withdrawn 
by, the President.74 
B.  The Methodology 
From 1977 to 2008, Presidents Jimmy Carter through George W. 
Bush successfully appointed 307 circuit court judges.75  Prior to being 
nominated, 82 of these judges worked in Top Five Markets, while 225 
came from smaller markets.76  Appendix 1 provides a database for all 
the judges from Top Five Markets.  For each judge, the Appendix 
notes (1) the nominating President, (2) the circuit to which the judge 
was nominated, (3) the city the judge had been working in when no-
 
69 See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT AND 
DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH DURING THE 107TH-




73 Id; see also Carolyn Lochhead, Senate Filibuster Showdown Averted, S.F. CHRON., 
May 24, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 8191182 (describing the compromise Re-
publican and Democrat senators reached to avoid a filibuster for several of George W. 
Bush’s more controversial circuit court nominees). 
74 See RUTKUS ET AL., supra note 69, at 4. 
75 See infra Appendices 1 & 2. 
76 Id.  Biographical information for each of these judges was drawn from the Fed-
eral Judicial Center’s database. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biographical Directory of Federal 
Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
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minated, (4) the Congress during which the judge was confirmed, (5) 
the nominee’s ABA rating, and (6) the number of days each nominee 
waited to be confirmed.  Appendix 2 provides a similar database for 
all the judges from smaller markets. 
 The databases measure the length of a judge’s confirmation time in 
two different ways.  First, the number of days is calculated from the date 
of nomination to the date of confirmation within that same congres-
sional session.  A simple explanation comes from the 98th Congress: 
On August 1, 1984, President Reagan nominated Cynthia Hall to the 9th 
Circuit.  On October 3, 1984, the Senate confirmed Hall.  Thus, Hall 
waited 63 days to be confirmed.
77
 
A slightly more complicated case from the 98th Congress involves sep-
arate nominations:78   
On July 13, 1983, President Reagan nominated Ken Starr to the D.C. 
Circuit.
79
  On August 4, 1983, the Senate returned Starr’s nomination to 
the President.
80
  On September 13, 1983, President Reagan resubmitted 
the nomination.
81
  On September 20, 1983, the Senate confirmed Starr.
82
  
Thus, from July 13 to September 20, Starr waited 69 days to be con-
firmed. 
The database refers to this metric as “Time by Congress.” 
The second way to calculate confirmation time captures the total 
number of days a nominee waited to be confirmed.  For most nomi-
nees, this total is no different than the figure yielded by the first calcu-
lation.83  However, some nominees were nominated in successive Con-
gresses, creating a much longer delay from nomination to 
confirmation.  For instance, during the 98th Congress, 
 
77 See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges:  Hall, Cynthia 
Holcomb, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (follow “H” hyperlink; then select 
“Hall, Cynthia Holcomb” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  For most nominees, 
the calculation was similarly straightforward. 
78 The Federal Judicial Center’s biographical database does not include informa-
tion about prior nominations.  Information about such nominations was therefore 
drawn from other sources.  See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., NOMINATIONS TO ARTICLE III LOWER COURTS BY PRESIDENT GEORGE 
W. BUSH DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS 9-10 (2008); RUTKUS ET AL., supra note 69, at 
39-45; KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RETURNS AND RESUBMISSIONS OF 
NOMINEES TO THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURTS, 1977–2006 (2007).  




83 For instance, Judge Hall’s “Total Time” would also be 63 days, and Judge Starr’s 
would also be 69 days. 
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on August 1, 1984, President Reagan nominated Frank Easterbrook to 
the Seventh Circuit.
84
  On October 18, 1984, the Senate returned the 
nomination to the President.
85
 
Then, during the 99th Congress, 
on February 25, 1985, President Reagan resubmitted the nomination.
86
  
On April 3, 1985, Easterbrook was confirmed.
87
  Thus, from August 1, 
1984, to April 3, 1985, Easterbrook waited a total of 245 days to be con-
firmed. 
The database refers to this second metric as “Total Time.” 
To accurately analyze confirmation-time data, both calculations 
are necessary.  Only the first calculation, “Time by Congress,” can 
measure discrepancies that could be created by the nature of the con-
firming Senate.88  This first metric, however, fails to capture the total 
delay each nominee endured.  Consider again the delay in confirma-
tion for Judge Easterbrook.  During the 99th Congress, he was con-
firmed in 37 days.  This figure suggests that he breezed through the 
confirmation process.  In reality, as the second metric, “Total Time,” 
reveals, Easterbrook waited 245 days.  This figure more accurately re-
flects the battles that took place during his confirmation.89  Inclusion 
of the “total time” metric therefore provides a fuller picture of a no-
minee’s confirmation delay.90 
 




88 During years of divided government, when the President is of one party and the 
majority of the Senate is of another, confirmation times are greatly above average.  In-
deed, during periods of divided government, it took the average nominee 151 days to 
be confirmed.  By contrast, during periods of united government, it took the average 
nominee 72 days to be confirmed.  Thus, if there were a high concentration of nomi-
nees from Top Five Markets during periods of divided government, the discrepancy in 
confirmation times between large and small markets could largely be explained by this 
“divided government” effect.  This, however, is not the case.  See infra subsection III.D.2. 
89 When Easterbrook was nominated, the ABA gave him one of their lowest rat-
ings, “Qualified/Not Qualified.”  See John R. Lott, Jr., Pulling Rank, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 
2006, at A21.  Easterbrook now ranks among the most cited federal circuit judges of all 
time.  See id.  Republicans attribute his ABA rating to his conservative judicial philoso-
phy.  See id. (arguing that ABA ratings may reflect a liberal bias). 
90 This figure, however, has two drawbacks.  First, it potentially includes too much 
“downtime”—that is, time during which the nomination is not before the Senate.  Pres-
ident Reagan waited from October 18, 1984, the day the Senate returned Judge Eas-
terbrook’s nomination, until February 25, 1985, to resubmit the nomination.  See 
SCOTT, supra note 78, at 22.  The longer the delay in resubmission, the more bloated 
the “Total Time” figure will be.  Second, because those nominated in multiple Con-
gresses have such relatively high confirmation times, this figure loses its statistical signi-
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C.  The Data 
From 1977 to 2008, judges from Top Five Markets waited 19% longer 
during any single Congress91 to be confirmed than non–Top Five 
Market nominees.  Top Five Market judges waited, on average, 124 
days to be confirmed, while judges from smaller markets waited 104 
days.92 
 
Figure 1:  Days to Be Confirmed (By Congress) 
 
 
When calculated as the total number of days a nominee waited be-
fore being confirmed, there is an even larger gap.  Judges from Top 
Five Markets waited 28% longer to be confirmed.  They waited, on av-







ficance if the sample set is whittled down to too small a size (say, to measure by circuit 
or by President).  Thus, both confirmation-time metrics are necessary. 
91 As discussed supra Section III.B, the “Time by Congress” calculation measures 
the time from first nomination to a successful confirmation during that Congress.  This 
is the only calculation for nearly all of the judges included in the Appendices. 
92 See infra Appendices 1 & 2. 
93 See id. 
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Figure 2:  Days to Be Confirmed (Total Time) 
 
D.  Potential Objections 
This discrepancy in confirmation times would be meaningless if 
Presidents had disproportionately selected nominees from Top Five 
Markets during (1) recent presidencies or (2) periods of divided gov-
ernment.94  During both of these periods, the Senate took much long-
er than average to confirm all nominees.95  Remarkably, though, for 
each of these periods, the percentage of nominees from Top Five 
Markets is almost exactly the same as it is in comparison to the entire 
sample.96  Moreover, during each of these periods, nominees from 
Top Five Markets consistently waited longer than their counterparts to 
be confirmed.97  Thus, these longer confirmation times are not due to 
the nominating President or the makeup of the confirming Senate.  
Rather, some other explanation must be found.98 
 
94 “Recent presidencies,” for the purposes of this analysis, refers to the presiden-
cies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  “Divided governments” occur when one party 
controls the presidency, but the other party controls the Senate. 
95 See infra subsections III.D.1-2. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See infra Section III.E. 
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1.  The Presidency Objection 
From 1977 to 2008, average confirmation times increased dramat-
ically.99  Nominees from the Clinton and W. Bush presidencies took 
far longer (an average of 163 days) to be confirmed than nominees 
from the Carter, Reagan, and H.W. Bush years (an average of 72 
days).100  A discrepancy between Top Five Market and non–Top Five 
Market nominees would be easily explained if nominees from Top 
Five Markets were disproportionately represented by Clinton or W. 
Bush nominees. 
 










H.W. Bush 42 93
Clinton 65 155
W. Bush 61 173
 Total Judges:  307 Average:  109 
 
Top Five Market nominees, however, make up almost exactly the 
same proportion of Clinton–W. Bush nominees as the entire 1977–
2008 sample set.  From 1977 to 2008, Presidents Carter through W. 
Bush appointed 307 judges, 82 of whom came from Top Five Mar-
kets.101  Thus, 27% of the overall sample set comprises judges from 
Top Five Markets.  Out of the 126 judges Presidents Clinton and W. 
Bush appointed, 35 came from Top Five Markets, accounting for 28% 
of those nominated during recent presidencies.102  Thus, judges from 







99 See infra Table 1. 
100 See id. 
101 See infra Appendices 1 & 2. 
102 See infra Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Judges from Top Five Markets  










H.W. Bush 11 42
Clinton 22 65
W. Bush 13 61
 
In addition, the Senate has consistently—for every President ex-
cept George W. Bush—taken longer to confirm nominees from Top 
Five Markets.  Using the “By Congress” calculation, which measures 
the time from the first nomination to a successful confirmation within 
that same Congress, it took nominees 56% longer (under Carter), 7% 
longer (under Reagan), 2% longer (under H.W. Bush), and 60% 
longer (under Clinton) to be confirmed than judges from non–Top 
Five Markets.103  W. Bush’s nominees were the exception:  his nomi-
nees from Top Five Markets were confirmed 26% faster than nomi-













103 See infra Figure 3. 
104 George W. Bush’s appointees may be anomalous simply because, during the 
107th Congress (a period of divided government), he successfully appointed seventeen 
judges who averaged 210 days to be confirmed (by far, the highest average for his no-
minees), but only one of these judges came from a Top Five Market.  See David G. Sa-
vage, Senate Ends Its Term with 72 Bush Judicial Nominees Affirmed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
2002, at 17, available at 2002 WLNR 12407129 (describing the ideological battle in the 
107th Congress over W. Bush’s nominations). 
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When the confirmation period is calculated as the total number of 
days a nominee waited to be confirmed, as opposed to days within a 
single Congress, the differences become even greater.  Top Five Mar-
ket nominees waited 56% longer under Carter, 9% longer under Rea-
gan, 27% longer under H.W. Bush, and 116% longer under Clinton.105  
Again, W. Bush’s nominees were the lone outliers, as his nominees 
from large markets were confirmed 22% faster.106 
 
105 One of Clinton’s Top Five Market nominees, Richard A. Paez, was nominated 
without confirmation in the 104th and 105th Congresses.  See SCOTT, supra note 78, at 
27.  He was finally confirmed in the 106th Congress, ending a 1513 day wait for con-
firmation.  See id.  That partially explains the drastic difference between Top Five Mar-
ket and non–Top Five Market nominees during the Clinton presidency, although even 
excluding Paez’s delay during the 104th and 105th Congresses, Clinton’s Top Five 
Market nominees still waited 86% longer than non–Top Five Market nominees.  The 
data set includes his total time, though, just as it includes the total time of three non–
Top Five Market nominees from the W. Bush presidency who were similarly nominated 
in three successive Congresses.  Thus, their effects on the overall totals serve to essen-
tially cancel each other out.  In addition, as discussed infra at subsection III.E.1, the 
overall averages are statistically significant (as the calculation for statistical significance 
accounts for the potential for outliers to skew the analysis).  For more on statistical sig-
nificance, see infra note 115. 
106 The “Total Time” data set does not include the total time from initial nomi-
nation to confirmation for three of President George W. Bush’s appointees whose con-
firmation processes were anomalous:  John G. Roberts, Helene White, and Roger Gre-
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Figure 4:  Days to Be Confirmed During Each Presidency 
 (Total Time) 
 
 
Thus, the general pattern holds over time.  Nominees from Top 
Five Markets consistently, except under George W. Bush, endured 
longer delays before confirmation.  More importantly, Top Five Mar-
ket nominees were not disproportionately nominated during recent 
presidencies.  Accordingly, the “presidency objection” fails to explain 
the significance of the longer confirmation times experienced by no-
minees from Top Five Markets. 
 
gory.  President George H.W. Bush initially nominated Chief Justice Roberts, and Pres-
ident Bill Clinton initially nominated White and Gregory.  See SCOTT, supra note 78, at 
23, 29, 31.  Given that their delays in confirmation spanned numerous years across 
presidencies controlled by different parties, their “Total Time” calculation does not 
begin with their initial nomination.  Rather, their “Total Time” calculation begins with 
the first time President George W. Bush nominated them. 
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2.  The “Divided Government” Objection 
During years of divided government, when one party controls the 
presidency but the other party controls the Senate, confirmation times 
are also sharply inflated.  During such periods, it took the average 
nominee 151 days to be confirmed.107  By contrast, during periods of 
united government, it took the average nominee just 78 days to be 
confirmed.108  Thus, a disproportionate number of nominations from 
Top Five Markets during periods of divided government could ac-
count for the discrepancy in confirmation times for large- and small-
market nominees. 
 
Table 3:  Averages Days to Confirmation in  






Average Days  
(By Congress) 








 Total Nominees:  132 Average:  151 
 
However, nominees from Top Five Markets were selected in al-
most exactly the same proportion during times of divided government 
as they were for the entire sample period.  Out of the entire sample 
set (307 judges), Top Five Market nominees make up 27% (82 
judges).  Out of judges confirmed during divided governments (132), 





107 See infra Table 3.  These averages were based on the “Time by Congress” calcu-
lation because that is the only calculation that could capture a discrepancy based on 
the makeup of the confirming Senate. 
108 For the entire sample set, the average confirmation delay is 109 days.  See supra 
Figure 1 (calculating days to be confirmed by Congress). 
109 See supra Table 3; infra Table 4. 
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 Total: 35 Total: 132 
 
Moreover, during these periods of divided government, nominees 
from Top Five Markets waited 19% longer to be confirmed than their 
counterparts from smaller markets.  Nominees from Top Five Markets 
waited, on average, 172 days to be confirmed, while their counterparts 
from smaller markets waited 144 days.110  This 19% difference is exact-
ly the same discrepancy between major- and minor-market confirma-
tion times found across the entire sample set.111 
 
Figure 5:  Days to Be Confirmed During Divided Governments 
 (By Congress) 
 
110 See infra Figure 5. 
111 See supra Figure 1. 
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The “divided government” objection cannot explain the pheno-
menon of longer confirmation times for judges from Top Five Mar-
kets. 
Thus, while the data reliably show that nominees from Top Five 
Markets wait longer to be confirmed, this phenomenon is not due to 
the Presidents who nominated them, nor is it due to the makeup of 
the Senate that considered their nominations.112  Rather, as the follow-
ing Section discusses, the discrepancy may be explained by factors 
specific to these nominees. 
E.  Why the Longer Confirmation Times? 
This Comment sets out to investigate whether inadequate com-
pensation tends to attract more ideologically driven judges to the fed-
eral bench.  Specifically, this Comment focuses on judges from Top 
Five Markets—the judges who, on average, passed up the largest profit 
differentials to become judges.  According to the lone prior study on 
judicial pay and performance, these judges are more partisan while on 
the bench.113  The new data reveal that these same judges wait consi-
derably longer to be confirmed.  Taken together, these factors strong-
ly suggest that these nominees are in fact more ideological than their 
peers.  For a lawyer deeply committed to ideology, the chance to exert 
influence through the federal judiciary might make the decision to 
forego a large salary for the federal bench far more attractive to her 
than it would be to her less ideological colleagues.  Therefore, low 
judicial pay in major markets might attract more ideological nominees 
to the federal bench. 
However, before reaching that conclusion, other plausible expla-
nations must be considered.114  There seem to be three remaining 
 
112 The data also show a spike in confirmation time for all nominees during the 
final Congress under each President (except for the final Congress under George W. 
Bush).  Thus, if nominees from Top Five Markets were overly concentrated during 
each President’s final Congress, the discrepancy in confirmation delays could be dis-
counted.  But this potential explanation would almost completely overlap with the “di-
vided government” objection because, for four of the five Presidents, their last Con-
gresses were periods of divided government.  As those data reveal, nominees were not 
disproportionately stacked during these last Congresses, and the difference in delay 
between nominees from large and small markets during these periods is similar to the 
difference across the entire sample set. 
113 See Baker, supra note 7, at 863-68 (discussing evidence suggesting that judges 
from Top Five Markets are more ideological than their peers). 
114 As with any regression, it is conceivable that an explanation beyond those con-
sidered in this Comment could be the cause of these longer confirmation times.  Al-
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plausible explanations for longer confirmation times for nominees 
from Top Five Markets:  (1) mere coincidence, (2) their low quality, 
or (3) the greater influence of the circuits on which the nominees will 
sit.  Each will be considered in turn. 
1.  Coincidence 
One must allow for the possibility that delay experienced by Top 
Five Market nominees is mere coincidence.  The reasons one nomi-
nee from a Top Five Market experienced a long delay to be confirmed 
could have been completely unrelated to the long delay another Top 
Five Market nominee endured.  Under such a supposition, if the past 
five Presidents had simply chosen different individuals, the average 
confirmation periods would be different, and perhaps, the argument 
goes, the discrepancies in confirmation times would disappear. 
Statistical analysis, however, rejects coincidence as an explanation 
for this phenomenon.115  The average days to confirmation for Top 
Five Market nominees, calculated as “Time by Congress,” exceeds the 
average for small-market nominees at a 95% confidence level.116  The 
 
though it is impossible to preclude this possibility, I have examined what I believe to be 
the most facially persuasive explanations. 
115 The findings here are statistically significant.  Most professional journals report 
the results of a statistical test in terms of its level of significance.  When data lead to an 
inference (here, that nominees from Top Five Markets wait longer to be confirmed 
than their peers from smaller markets), the level of significance measures that infe-
rence’s reliability.  A test for statistical significance employs the mean and variance of 
the sample to predict consistency if the process of drawing samples and computing 
confidence intervals were repeated.  In this instance we examine whether the mean for 
large-market nominees would exceed the mean for small-market nominees 90%, 95%, 
or 99% of the time.  See LYMAN OTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL METHODS AND 
DATA ANALYSIS 97-101, 123 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that inferences that reach the 95% 
confidence level have reached the “magic level” for statistical significance in most aca-
demic journals).  The judicial data set compiled here, of course, includes all the judges 
appointed from 1977 to 2008 rather than a sample.   
116 For the “Time by Congress” calculation for Top Five Market nominees, the 
mean is 124.2073, the variance is 10439.1293, and the standard deviation is 102.1721; 
for non–Top Five Market nominees, the mean is 104.0311, the variance is 7718.8963, 
and the standard deviation is 87.8572.  To test the null hypothesis that the average 
number of days to confirmation for Top Five Market nominees is not equal to its coun-
terpart for non–Top Five Market nominees, these numbers were plugged into a basic  
t-stat formula, yielding a t-value of 1.7117.  See DAVID G. KLEINBAUM ET AL., APPLIED 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIABLE METHODS 19-20 (Alexander Kugu-
shev ed., 3d ed. 1998) (describing the t-distribution methodology).  The relevant criti-
cal values are t.1 = 1.2816 (representing the 90% confidence level); t.05 = 1.64485 (95% 
confidence); and t.01 = 2.326 (99% confidence).  Id.  The “Time by Congress” t-statistic 
is above the “magic” 95% level for statistical significance.  See OTT, supra note 115, at 
123. 
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same calculation for “Total Time” yields a slightly less robust result; 
nevertheless, the average delay for Top Five Market nominees exceeds 
the average delay for small-market nominees at a 90% confidence lev-
el.117  The delays that Top Five Market nominees endure are therefore 
statistically significant, and the chance that they can be explained by 
coincidence is exceedingly slim. 
2.  Low Quality 
If nominees from Top Five Markets were, generally speaking, con-
siderably less qualified across the board than their peers, this would 
also explain the discrepancy in confirmation times.  Nothing, howev-
er, supports this view.  Indeed, there is no good reason to think that 
lawyers from major cities—the lawyers most handsomely rewarded by 
the market—would be, on average, far less qualified than lawyers from 
smaller cities. 
Two sets of data support this response.  One data set evaluates the 
judges’ quality at the time of nomination; the other analyzes the 
judges’ performance while on the bench. 
First, ABA ratings of nominee quality suggest that nominees from 
Top Five Markets are roughly as qualified as their peers.118  The ABA’s 
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary evaluates every nominee 
to the federal bench and then releases a rating based on the nomi-
nee’s integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament.119  
Ratings from 1989 to 2008 are available in the public domain.  During 
this period, the ABA’s data show nominees from Top Five Markets (46 
nominees) to be virtually indistinguishable from nominees from 
smaller markets (122 nominees).120  Assigning the ABA ratings a nu-
 
117 For the “Total Time” calculation, for Top Five Market nominees, the mean is 
199.4268, the variance is 73894.2477, and the standard deviation is 271.835; for non–
Top Five Market nominees, the mean is 151.5111, the variance is 45767.1706, and the 
standard deviation is 213.9326.  The “Total Time” average yielded a t-value of 1.6187.  
This value falls comfortably above the 90% confidence level and nearly reaches the 
95% level.  See supra note 116 (presenting the relevant t-statistics). 
118 ABA ratings have their flaws.  See supra note 89 (describing potential bias in 
ABA ratings).  They do, however, provide a rough measure for approximating nomi-
nee quality and should therefore be considered. 
119 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:  WHAT IT 
IS AND HOW IT WORKS 3-8 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ 
federal_ judiciary09.pdf (describing the Standing Committee’s procedure for evaluat-
ing and rating judicial nominees). 
120 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Ratings of Article III Judicial Nominees, http:// 
www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ratings.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (providing a list of 
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merical value on a scale of 1-5 (where 1 means “Well Qualified” and 5 
means “Not Qualified”),121 judges from Top Five Markets averaged 
1.91, while judges from smaller markets averaged 1.82.  Both sets of 
nominees averaged a rating of slightly better than “Well Quali-
fied/Qualified,” and the 2.4% difference between the two groups 
cannot explain the substantial disparity in confirmation delays. 
Second, Professor Baker’s data on judicial performance show that 
judges from Top Five Markets are at least as effective as their counter-
parts from smaller markets.122  After measuring the speed with which 
judges churned out opinions, the strength of those opinions (as 
measured by citation count), and the numbers of dissents filed, Baker 
found that the level of compensation foregone “does not impact vot-
ing patterns, citation practices, the speed of controversial case disposi-
tion, or opinion quality.”123  To be sure, any attempt to quantify judi-
cial performance has its shortcomings.  But to the extent that perfor-
performance can be quantified, judges from Top Five Markets have 
proven at least as capable as their peers in smaller markets. 
Thus, empirical data, supported by common sense, refute the view 
that judges from Top Five Markets are far less qualified than their 
peers.  Therefore, the longer confirmation times that Top Five Market 
nominees endure cannot be attributed to their abilities. 
3.  Circuit Influence 
The final competing explanation for the longer confirmation 
times that nominees from Top Five Markets experience considers the 
influence of the circuits on which these nominees will most likely sit.  
These nominees generally sit on circuit courts in or near their home 
markets.124  These circuits, one might argue, are some of the most in-
 
judicial nominees and their ratings from the 101st through 111th Congresses); infra 
Appendices 1 & 2. 
121 From 1 to 5 the categories were:  “Well Qualified,” “Well Qualified/Qualified,” 
“Qualified,” “Qualified/Not Qualified,” and “Not Qualified.”  This is the framework 
that the ABA has used since 1991.  The available ABA ratings, however, date back to 
1989.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 120.  From 1989 to 1990, the ABA also rated some 
nominees as “Exceptionally Well Qualified.”  See id.  Nominees receiving that rating are 
viewed, in this analysis, as though they received the ABA’s current highest score, “Well 
Qualified.” 
122 Baker, supra note 5, at 112. 
123 Id.  Analyzing Baker’s models, Professors Zorn, Henderson, and Czarnezki 
found that judges from Top Five Markets actually write opinions more quickly than 
their peers.  Zorn et al., supra note 2, at 834-35. 
124 For instance, most nominees from New York City sit on the Second Circuit.  
Indeed, of the 82 nominees from Top Five Markets, 63 (77%) were confirmed to cir-
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fluential.125  Therefore, the explanation goes, senators will put up the 
strongest fight against the nominees that will sit on these influential 
circuits. 
On its face, this explanation seems plausible.  Previous studies 
rank circuit court influence by the average number of outside cita-
tions each judge from a circuit receives.126  On this view, the Seventh 
and Second Circuits are two of the most influential.  The Seventh Cir-
cuit, which draws heavily from Chicago, ranks first in outside citations.  
The Second Circuit, which draws heavily from New York City, ranks 
third.127  The confirmation times for these judges, according to the 
circuit-influence theory, should be relatively long.  By contrast, the 
Ninth and D.C. Circuits rank among the least influential according to 
citation count.128  The Ninth Circuit, which draws mostly from San 
Francisco and Los Angeles, ranks tenth.129  The D.C. Circuit, which 
draws mostly from the District of Columbia, ranks twelfth (out of thir-
 
cuits having chambers in the city where the nominee had worked.  See infra Appendix 
1. 
125 It is debatable which circuits, if any, are more influential than the others.  Each 
of the circuit courts has the same status under the Constitution, regardless of location.  
See U.S CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing, in part, that the “judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish”); see also, e.g., Julia Turner, What’s So 
Important About the Washington, D.C., Circuit Court of Appeals?, SLATE, Feb. 7, 2003, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2078310 (arguing that there is no reason to think that the 
D.C. Circuit is more influential than any of the other twelve courts of appeals).  One 
promising way of measuring circuit influence, however, is by citation analysis.  See Wil-
liam M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence:  A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals 
Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 302-05 (ranking circuit court influence by the average 
number of outside citations each judge from a circuit receives).  As imperfect as this 
metric may be, this Comment relies on it to test the “circuit influence” hypothesis. 
126 See Landes et al., supra note 125, at 304 tbl.3 (employing this methodology to 
rank circuit court influence). 
127 Id. 
128 The Federal Circuit actually ranks last in outside-citation count, but it is not 
included here, because of its specialized patent-case docket.  The low ranking of the 
D.C. Circuit could be viewed with skepticism, as the D.C. Circuit’s docket includes a 
large number of administrative appeals that are generally not heard as frequently in 
other circuits.  Indeed, many view the D.C. Circuit as the most influential.  But see 
Turner, supra note 125 (questioning the widely held view that the D.C. Circuit is the 
most influential among the circuits).  It is worth noting, however, that the delay for 
nominees to the D.C. Circuit is a middling 103 days.  The average delay for the entire 
sample set is 109 days.  This average delay for nominees to the D.C. Circuit is inconsis-
tent with the circuit-influence theory and reinforces the view that circuit influence is a 
nebulous concept that—to the extent that its effects can be measured—seems to have 
no impact on confirmation delays. 
129 See Landes et al., supra note 125, at 304 tbl.3. 
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teen).130  Nominees to these less-influential circuits, according to the 
circuit-influence theory, should be confirmed much faster than aver-
age. 
On close examination of the data, however, the circuit-influence 
explanation collapses.  Across the entire sample set, nominees to the 
Seventh Circuit get confirmed fastest.131  Meanwhile, nominees to the 
Ninth Circuit take the longest to be confirmed.132  From a circuit-
influence perspective, it makes no sense for nominees to the most in-
fluential circuit (the Seventh) to have the shortest confirmation times, 
while nominees to one of the least influential circuits (the Ninth) 
have the longest.  These contradictory results suggest that the influ-
ence of the circuit has little bearing on the confirmation process.133 
However, even if circuit influence somehow still affects confirma-
tion times,134 the circuits to which nominees from Top Five Markets 
were overwhelmingly nominated to (the Seventh, Second, Ninth, and 
D.C.) lie on both ends of the influence spectrum.  The 23 Top Five 
Market nominees to the influential Seventh and Second Circuits 
should inflate the average confirmation times, while the 38 Top Five 
Market nominees to the less-influential Ninth and D.C. Circuits 
should deflate the average times.135  Thus, even if circuits have some 
effect, this counterbalancing renders the circuit-influence theory use-
less in explaining the longer confirmation times for nominees from 





130 Id.  
131 See infra Table 5. 
132 Id. 
133 In addition, there are theoretical difficulties in trying to link circuit influence 
to longer confirmation times over the past thirty years.  The most influential circuits 
are influential, in large part, because of the judges who now sit on them.  See Landes et 
al., supra note 125, at 302 (noting that the Seventh Circuit boasts five of the ten most 
cited circuit court judges).  Thus, it is not the most influential judges’ confirmation 
times that would have been affected by circuit influence but rather the confirmation 
times of nominees to that circuit in the future.   
134 There is some support for this view.  For instance, the Second Circuit ranks 
third in citation count and its nominees have the third-longest confirmation times.  See 
infra Table 5. 
135 See id. 
136 Importantly, there are no outlier circuit averages here.  The average-days fig-
ures are all fairly well clustered around the mean.  This suggests there is little circuit 
influence on confirmation times. 
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Top Five  
Markets 
1 7th 83 8 
2 1st 84 1 
3 2nd 113 15 
4 8th 127 0 
5 5th 95 0 
6 3rd 108 3 
7 4th 101 2 
8 10th 115 1 
9 6th 111 1 
10 9th 128 22 
11 11th 109 0 
12 D.C. 103 16 
 
4.  Ideology 
The best explanation for why nominees from Top Five Markets 
experience longer confirmation times is that these nominees tend to 
hold stronger ideological views than their peers.  In modern confir-
mation battles, the extent to which a nominee is “too conservative” or 
“too liberal” often plays a major role in the level of opposition that the 
nominee encounters.137  Thus, a nominee’s commitment to ideology is 
a facially plausible explanation for longer confirmation times. 
There are, however, as previously discussed, four other conceiva-
ble explanations for a nominee’s longer confirmation time:  (1) the 
era when nominated; (2) the partisan makeup of the government 
when nominated; (3) the nominee’s quality; and (4) circuit influence.  
As shown above, none of these explanations, standing alone, can ac-
 
137 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Judgeship Deal Called into Question:  Party-Line Split Rais-
es Possibility of Filibuster Again, WASH. POST, May 26, 2005, at A7 (discussing attempts by 
Democratic Senators to block some of George W. Bush’s most conservative circuit 
court nominees); Charlie Savage, Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices:  Trend 
Reagan Started, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at A1 (describing the “conservative anchors” 
President George W. Bush nominated to the appellate courts, including Judges Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Jeffrey S. Sutton, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Janice Rogers 
Brown—all of whom experienced longer-than-usual confirmation delays). 
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count for the longer confirmation times nominees from Top Five 
Markets endure.138 
Moreover, even when considering these factors together, nomi-
nees from Top Five Markets still experience longer delays.  Indeed, we 
can construct a model showing139 that—even after controlling for 
these explanations as far as possible140—nominees from Top Five Mar-
kets still experience confirmation times longer than those of their 
non–Top Five Market peers.  The model is a linear regression that 
analyzes whether a nominee’s city affects her confirmation time, even 
after controlling for the combined effect of (1) the nominee’s ABA 
rating, (2) the Congressional term when confirmed, and (3) the parti-
san relationship between the nominating President and confirming 
Senate.141  As expected, the model reveals that all three of these factors 
have a highly significant effect on the nominee’s confirmation time.142  
 
138 See supra subsections III.D-E.3 (analyzing the merits of each of these explana-
tions individually). 
139 The model demonstrates this point at a statistically significant level.  For a 
complete discussion of statistical significance, see supra note 115. 
140 Circuit influence is left out of the model because as argued in the previous sec-
tion, it is too nebulous a concept to be quantified.  Even when it is quantified by cita-
tion count, the influence of the circuit seems to have no effect on the length of con-
firmation times.  A second limitation is that the model only considers judges 
confirmed from 1988 through 2008, because the ABA only began rating nominee qual-
ity in 1988. 
141 The model can be written as  
              y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4.   
where the independent variable, y, represents days to confirmation (measured as 
“Time by Congress”); x1, x2, x3, and x4 represent, respectively:  city (a binary variable—1 
for a Top Five Market city, 0 otherwise), congressional term (numerical, capturing 
changes across time; ten Congresses included), ABA rating (on a scale from 1 to 5), 
and the partisan relationship between the nominating President and confirming Se-
nate (binary—1 for different parties, 0 otherwise).  The coefficients and their standard 
errors are as follows: 
  βcity βCongress βABA βpartisan β0
Coefficient 23.6042 12.78371 12.74724 55.91529 -1266 
σ 16.43234 2.707281 7.676876 16.55985 288.1468 
 
142 The coefficients on the binary variables for congressional term (β2) and divided 
governments (β4) are statistically significant at the 99% level.  Their t-values are 
4.721974 and 3.376559, respectively, beyond the critical value of 2.326.  See supra notes 
115-116 (explaining the relevant t-statistics and the threshold for statistical signific-
ance).  The coefficient on the binary variable for ABA rating (β3) is statistically signifi-
cant at the 95% level.  Its t-value is 1.660472, above the critical value of 1.64485.  Id.  
These results simply mean that in the year the nominee was confirmed, the partisan 
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But even after controlling for these factors, the nominee’s city still has 
a statistically significant effect on confirmation time.143  Thus, the 
model confirms that, for some reason other than the alternative ex-
planations already considered, nominees from Top Five Markets ex-
perience longer confirmation times than their peers. 
I posit that the only remaining persuasive explanation for this de-
lay is that nominees from Top Five Markets tend to be more ideologi-
cal than their peers.  This explanation rests on the obvious connection 
between strong ideological views and tougher confirmation proceed-
ings.144  Moreover, it effectively accounts for why nominees from major 
markets, in particular, would experience longer confirmation delays.  
In short, nominees from major markets pass up enormous sums of 
money to become judges, and so they often need some additional mo-
tivation to join the federal bench.  Strong ideological views would pro-
vide that motivation and explain the longer confirmation times these 
nominees endure. 
This explanation is grounded in more than theory; it also has em-
pirical support.  The lone existing study on the link between judicial 
pay and performance reveals that judges from Top Five Markets are 
more ideological while on the bench.145  The citation practices of 
these judges and their votes in controversial cases reflect a heightened 
level of commitment to ideology.146  As such, it seems that nominees 
from Top Five Markets really are more ideological than their peers.  
That is the story that the prior data tell, and it seems to be the judg-
ment of the Senators considering their nominations—a judgment that 
may be more reliable than any rough empirical attempt to quantify a 
judge’s level of commitment to ideology.147 
 
relationship between the nominating President and confirming Senate, and the nomi-
nee’s quality all tend, on their own, to increase a nominee’s delay in confirmation. 
143
β1, the coefficient on the binary variable for city, is statistically significant at the 
90% level.  Its t-value is 1.436448, above the critical value of 1.2816.  Id.  As expected, 
the city variable holds less explanatory power than the other three factors.  Crucially, 
though, it remains statistically significant, even in a model that includes the more ob-
vious reasons for confirmation delay. 
144 See, e.g., Savage, supra note 137 (noting that Democrats blocked the confirma-
tion of several conservative W. Bush nominees for years). 
145 See Baker, supra note 7, at 868 (noting that the data reveal more “partisan vot-
ing among judges in top-five markets”). 
146 See Baker, supra note 5, at 85-86 (tracking, for instance, the extent to which 
Democrat-appointed judges voted for liberal outcomes in controversial cases and cited 
fellow Democrat appointees). 
147 See id. at 85 (“Measuring judicial ideology is a tricky business.”).  In addition to 
confirmation delay, though, there is another possible proxy for nominee ideology:  the 
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F.  Causation 
Given that nominees from Top Five Markets are more ideological 
than their peers, finding a causal link between low pay and these 
judges’ increased ideology requires just one small inferential step.  
The data show that judges who, on average, passed up the greatest fi-
nancial opportunities to leave the private sector tend to be more 
committed to ideology than their peers.148  This strongly suggests that 
the large discrepancy in pay between the private sector and the judi-
ciary in Top Five Markets tends to attract more ideological nominees 
to the bench.  In the absence of some other compelling explanation, 
one should read the data in this light. 
There is no other compelling explanation.149  Rather, basic eco-
nomics and human nature tell the tale:  In small markets, most highly 
qualified lawyers will gladly take a significant, but manageable, pay cut 
for the numerous nonpecuniary benefits the judiciary offers (such as 
prestige, influence, and a more leisurely workload).  In major mar-
kets, however, where the salary cut might be as high as ninety percent, 
the decision to make the switch becomes more difficult.  For lawyers 
deeply committed to ideology, the chance to exert so much influence 
at so high a level makes the position far more attractive than it might 
be to their less ideological colleagues.  As such, low judicial pay in ma-
jor markets tends to attract more ideological nominees to the federal 
bench.  That, at least, is the most persuasive account supported by the 
data. 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s legal market, a first-year associate working at a top firm 
in a major city stands a good chance of earning as much as a federal 
judge.  Such comparatively low judicial pay has not detracted from the 
quality of the judiciary.  But it has, in major markets, tended to attract 
 
Senate voting record on each nominee.  A project that would compile that informa-
tion, and compare it to this data, would be a welcome addition to this field. 
148 Based on earnings figures in Top Five Markets, this Comment assumes that 
judges from Top Five Markets could have earned considerably more in these markets 
than their counterparts from smaller markets could have earned.  This assumption, 
however, is not particularized to individual judges.   
149 Perhaps one might hypothesize that all people in Top Five Markets are, by a 
substantial margin, more partisan than the rest of the country.  But there is no compel-
ling reason to think that people who live in Top Five Markets are inherently signifi-
cantly more ideological—on both sides of the political spectrum—than people from 
the rest of the country. 
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more ideologically driven judges to the federal bench.  As such, high-
er judicial pay could, at least in major markets, diminish partisanship 
in the federal judiciary. 
The first step toward ameliorating the problems caused by low 
judicial pay in major markets is simple.  Federal judges across the na-
tion are paid the same regardless of the location of their chambers or 
residences.150  By contrast, General Schedule federal employees who 
work in major markets receive salaries that are adjusted upward to ac-
count for the higher costs of living in these cities.151  Adopting this so-
lution for federal judges is, in the words of Judge Posner, “long over-
due.”152  By providing robust cost of living increases for judges in 
major markets, Congress would, first, be acknowledging the reality 
that living in places like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles is sub-
stantially more expensive than living elsewhere in the country.  
Second, Congress would be taking an important step toward under-
mining partisanship in the federal judiciary.153 
The second recommendation is just as simple.  Congress should 
ensure that judicial pay keeps pace with inflation.  Congress provides 
an annual cost-of-living increase for every other federal employee—
including, in 2008, themselves.154  However, Congress provides no 
such incremental raise for judges.  In fact, over the years, Congress 
has let the real value of a federal judge’s salary decline.155  In his latest 
plea for a judicial pay raise, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized, 
I suspect many are tired of hearing it, and I know I am tired of saying it, 
but I must make this plea again—Congress must provide judicial com-
pensation that keeps pace with inflation.  Judges knew what the pay was 
when they answered the call of public service.  But they did not know 
that Congress would steadily erode that pay in real terms by repeatedly 
failing over the years to provide even cost-of-living increases.
156 
Finally, with a new appreciation for the consequences that follow 
from low judicial pay, Congress should continue to diligently consider 
 
150 See SCOTT, supra note 14, at 30. 
151 See id. 
152 POSNER, supra note 66, at 172. 
153 See supra note 124 (pointing out that 77% of judges from Top Five Markets 
have been appointed to a judicial seat in their home city). 
154 See Roberts, 2008 Year-End Report, supra note 15, at 3 (“Congress failed, once 
again, to provide judges an annual cost-of-living increase this year, even though it pro-
vided one to every other federal employee, including every member of Congress.”). 
155 See Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that judicial pay, 
adjusted for inflation, has declined twenty-nine percent since 1969). 
156 See Roberts, 2008 Year-End Report, supra note 15, at 3. 
FORR FINAL PRINT REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  3:21 PM 
2010] Ideology and Judicial Pay 893 
the calls by Chief Justice Roberts, the ABA, and top law school deans 
for an across-the-board pay raise for federal judges.157  The data pre-
sented here show that the greater the profits foregone, the more ideo-
logical the judge tends to be.  For the moment, this phenomenon 
seems limited to judges from Top Five Markets—the judges who pass 
up the most staggering profit differentials to become judges.  Howev-
er, if law-firm profits continue to surge ahead while judicial pay con-
tinues to lag behind, nearly every potential nominee to the bench will 
be in the same situation that potential nominees from Top Five Mar-
kets currently find themselves in.  One wonders whether, over time, 
more judges will be attracted to the federal bench for the opportunity 
to indoctrinate.  This result could not be more contrary to the Found-
ers’ vision.  As Alexander Hamilton put it, “[t]he independence of the 
judges once destroyed, the constitution is gone, it is a dead letter; it is 





















157 See Baker, supra note 5, at 64-65 & nn.1-5 (noting that “prominent law school 
deans, the American Bar Association, and leading members of the corporate bar” have 
endorsed Chief Justice Roberts’s statements on judicial pay). 
158 Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, 
The Examination, COM. ADVERTISER (New York), Feb. 26, 1802, as reprinted in XXV THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 525 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977)). 
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Arthur L. Carter 9 LA 96 64 64 
Altimari, 
 Frank X. Reagan 2 NY 99 54 54 
Archer,  
Glenn Leroy Jr. Reagan Fed. DC 99 61 61 
Bea,  
Carlos W. Bush 9 SF 108 171 171 4 
Berzon,  
Marsha S. Clinton 9 SF 106 407 772 105 2 
Boggs,  
Danny Julian Reagan 6 DC 99 84 84 
Bork,  
Robert H. Reagan D.C. DC 97 63 63 
Boudin,  
Michael H.W. Bush 1 DC 102 62 62 1 
Brown, 
 Janice R. W. Bush D.C. SF 109 114 684 108 4 
Bryson,  
William C. Clinton Fed. DC 103 98 98 1 
Buckley, 
 James L. Reagan D.C. NY 99 62 62 
Chertoff,  
Michael W. Bush 3 DC 108 96 96 1 
Clevenger, 
Raymond C. H.W. Bush Fed. DC 101 93 93 3 
Cudahy,  
Richard D. Carter 7 DC 96 126 126 
Dyk, 
 Timothy B. Clinton Fed. DC 106 443 784 105 3 
Easterbrook, 
Frank H. Reagan 7 CHI 99 37 208 98 
Fernandez, 
Ferdinand F. H.W. Bush 9 LA 101 79 244 100 1 
Fisher,  
Raymond Clinton 9 LA 106 204 204 1 
Flaum, 
 Joel M. Reagan 7 CHI 98 20 20 
Fletcher,  
William A. Clinton 9 SF 105 274 1262 104 1 
Fuentes,  
Julio M. Clinton 3 NY 106 365 365 4 
Gajarsa,  
Arthur J. Clinton Fed. DC 105 205 469 104 3 
Garland,  
Merrick B. Clinton D.C. DC 105 71 561 104 1 
Ginsburg,  
Douglas H. Reagan D.C. DC 99 15 15 
Ginsburg,  
Ruth Bader Carter D.C. NY 96 65 65 
Gorsuch,  
Neil M. W. Bush 10 DC 109 71 71 1 
Hall,  
Cynthia H. Reagan 9 LA 98 63 63 
Ikuta,  
Sandra S. W. Bush 9 LA 109 131 131 1 
Jacobs,  
Dennis G.  H.W. Bush 2 NY 102 193 193 3 
Katzmann, 
Robert A. Clinton 2 DC 106 128 128 1 
Kavanaugh, 
Brett M. W. Bush D.C. DC 109 431 1036 108 2 
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Amalya L. Carter 2 NY 96 47 47 
Kozinski,  
Alex Reagan 9 DC 99 155 155 
Leval, 
 Pierre Nelson Clinton 2 NY 103 73 73 1 
Linn,  
Richard Clinton Fed. DC 106 52 52 3 
Livingston, 
Debra A. W. Bush 2 NY 110 120 315 109 1 
Luttig,  
J. Michael H.W. Bush 4 DC 102 94 94 4 
Mahoney, 
 John D. Reagan 2 NY 99 48 48 
Mayer,  
Haldane R. Reagan Fed. DC 100 128 128 
Michel,  
Paul R. Reagan Fed. DC 100 72 72 
Mikva,  
Abner J. Carter D.C. CHI 96 119 119 
Moore,  
Kimberly A. W. Bush Fed. DC 109 110 110 3 
Nelson,  
Dorothy W. Carter 9 LA 96 82 82 
Newman,  
Pauline Reagan Fed. NY 98 28 28 
Noonan,  
John T., Jr. Reagan 9 SF 99 61 61 
Norris,  
William A. Carter 9 LA 96 112 112 
Paez,  





Jr. W. Bush 2 NY 107 155 155 1 
Pierce,  
Lawrence W. Reagan 2 NY 97 71 71 
Plager,  
S. Jay H.W. Bush Fed. DC 101 57 57 2 
Poole,  
Cecil F. Carter 9 SF 96 46 46 
Posner,  
Richard A. Reagan 7 CHI 97 28 28 
Pratt,  
George C. Reagan 2 NY 97 53 53 
Prost,  
Sharon W. Bush Fed. DC 107 123 123 4 
Pregerson,  
Harry Carter 9 LA 96 64 64 
Raggi,  
Reena W. Bush 2 NY 107 142 142 1 
Reinhardt,  
Stephen R. Carter 9 LA 96 286 286 
Ripple,  
Kenneth F. Reagan 7 DC 99 32 32 
Roberts,  
John G., Jr. W. Bush D.C. DC 108 121 729 107 1 
Rogers, 
 Judith Ann 
Wilson Clinton D.C. DC 103 113 113 1 
Rovner,  
Ilana Kara  
Diamond H.W. Bush 7 CHI 102 41 41 1 
Rymer,  
Pamela Ann H.W. Bush 9 LA 101 79 387 100 1 
Sack,  
Robert D. Clinton 2 NY 105 221 221 3 
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H. Lee Clinton 3 NY 103 152 152 1 
Scalia,  
Antonin Reagan D.C. CHI 97 21 21 
Schall,  
Alvin Anthony H.W. Bush Fed. DC 102 162 162 2 
Silberman,  
Laurence H. Reagan D.C. DC 99 44 44 
Smith,  
Milan D., Jr. W. Bush 9 LA 109 91 91 2 
Sneeden,  
Emory M. Reagan 4 DC 98 64 64 
Sotomayor, 
Sonia Clinton 2 NY 105 464 464 2 
Starr,  
Kenneth W. Reagan D.C. DC 98 69 69 
Straub,  
Chester J. Clinton 2 NY 105 110 110 3 
Tashima,  
Atsushi Wallace Clinton 9 LA 104 271 271 1 
Tatel,  
David Clinton D.C. DC 103 108 108 1 
Thomas,  
Clarence H.W. Bush D.C. DC 101 127 127 3 
Trott,  
Stephen S.  Reagan 9 LA 100 230 230 
Wald,  
Patricia M. Carter D.C. DC 96 85 85 
Walker,  
John Mercer, Jr. H.W. Bush 2 NY 101 61 61 1 
Wardlaw,  
Kim McLane Clinton 9 LA 105 185 185 3 
Wiggins,  
Charles E. Reagan 9 SF 98 63 63 
Williams,  
Ann C. Clinton 7 CHI 106 97 97 1 
Wood,  
Diane Pamela Clinton 7 DC 104 91 91 1 
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Steven G. W. Bush 4 Minor 110 68 68 1 
Alito,  
Samuel A., Jr. H.W. Bush 3 Minor 101 66 66 1 
Ambro,  
Thomas L. Clinton 3 Minor 106 135 135 2 
Anderson,  
R. Lanier, III Carter 5 Minor 96 85 85 
Anderson,  
Stephen H. Reagan 10 Minor 99 85 85 
Arnold,  
Morris S. H.W. Bush 8 Minor 102 197 197 2 
Arnold,  
Richard S. Carter 8 Minor 96 63 63 
Baldock,  
Bobby R. Reagan 10 Minor 99 70 70 
Barkett,  
Rosemary Clinton 11 Minor 103 202 202 1 
Barksdale,  
Rhesa H. H.W. Bush 5 Minor 101 112 112 2 
Barry,  
Maryanne T. Clinton 3 Minor 106 88 88 1 
Batchelder, 
Alice M. H.W. Bush 6 Minor 102 168 168 3 
Beam,  
C. Arlen Reagan 8 Minor 100 128 128 
Becker,  
Edward R. Reagan 3 Minor 97 17 17 
Beezer,  
Robert R. Reagan 9 Minor 98 25 25 
Benavides,  
Fortunato P. Clinton 5 Minor 103 99 99 2 
Benton,  
William D. W. Bush 8 Minor 108 133 133 1 
Birch,  
Stanley F., Jr. H.W. Bush 11 Minor 101 50 50 3 
Bissel,  
Jean G. Reagan Fed Minor 98 15 15 
Black,  
Susan H. H.W. Bush 11 Minor 102 154 154 1 
Boochever, 
Robert Carter 9 Minor 96 27 27 
Bowman,  
Pasco M., II Reagan 8 Minor 98 55 55 
Bownes,  
Hugh H. Carter 1 Minor 95 18 18 
Breyer,  
Stephen G. Carter 1 Minor 96 26 26 
Briscoe,  
Mary B. Clinton 10 Minor 104 72 72 1 
Brorby,  
Wade Reagan 10 Minor 100 193 193 
Brown, 
 Bailey Carter 6 Minor 96 194 194 
Brunetti,  
Melvin T. Reagan 9 Minor 99 36 180 98 
Bybee,  
Jay S. W. Bush 9 Minor 108 65 295 107 2 
Bye,  
Kermit E. Clinton 8 Minor 106 308 308 2 
Cabranes,  
Jose A. Clinton 2 Minor 103 77 77 1 
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Guido Clinton 2 Minor 103 159 159 2 
Callahan,  
Consuelo M. W. Bush 9 Minor 108 99 99 2 
Canby,  
William C., Jr. Carter 9 Minor 96 49 49 
Cardamone, 
Richard J. Reagan 2 Minor 97 28 28 
Carnes,  
Edward E. H.W. Bush 11 Minor 102 226 226 3 
Chagares,  
Michael A. W. Bush 3 Minor 109 69 69 1 
Chapman, 
 Robert F. Reagan 4 Minor 97 62 62 
Clark,  
Thomas A. Carter 5 Minor 96 64 64 
Clay,  
Eric L. Clinton 6 Minor 105 205 512 104 1 
Clement, 
 Edith Brown W. Bush 5 Minor 107 188 188 2 
Clifton,  
Richard R. W. Bush 9 Minor 107 391 391 3 
Coffey,  
John L. Reagan 7 Minor 97 27 27 
Cole,  
R. Guy, Jr. Clinton 6 Minor 104 176 176 1 
Colloton,  
Steven M. W. Bush 8 Minor 108 204 204 3 
Contie,  
Leroy J., Jr. Reagan 6 Minor 97 37 37 
Cook,  
Deborah L. W. Bush 6 Minor 108 118 726 107 3 
Cowen,  
Robert E. Reagan 3 Minor 100 91 91 
Cox,  
Emmett R. Reagan 11 Minor 100 118 118 
Cyr,  
Conrad K. H.W. Bush 1 Minor 101 81 81 1 
Daughtrey, 
Martha C. Clinton 6 Minor 103 106 106 1 
Davis,  
W. Eugene Reagan 5 Minor 98 14 14 
DeMoss,  
Harold R., Jr. H.W. Bush 5 Minor 102 153 153 3 
Dennis,  
James L. Clinton 5 Minor 104 240 477 103 3 
Dubina, 
 Joel F. H.W. Bush 11 Minor 101 113 113 2 
Duhe,  
John Malcolm, 
Jr. Reagan 5 Minor 100 109 109 
Duncan,  
Allyson K. W. Bush 4 Minor 108 80 80 1 
Ebel,  
David M. Reagan 10 Minor 100 123 123 
Edmondson, 
James L. Reagan 11 Minor 99 34 34 
Edwards,  
Harry T. Carter D.C. Minor 96 76 76 
Elrod, 
 Jennifer W. W. Bush 5 Minor 110 189 189 3 
Ervin,  
Samuel James, 
III Carter 4 Minor 96 49 49 
Eshbach, 
 Jesse E. Reagan 7 Minor 97 35 35 
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Terence T. Clinton 7 Minor 104 108 108 2 
Fagg,  
George G. Reagan 8 Minor 97 9 9 
Farris,  
Joseph J. Carter 9 Minor 96 76 76 
Ferguson,  
Warren J. Carter 9 Minor 96 59 59 
Fisher,  
D. Michael W. Bush 3 Minor 108 222 222 2 
Fletcher,  
Betty B. Carter 9 Minor 96 76 76 
Garwood,  
William L. Reagan 5 Minor 97 34 34 
Garza,  
Emilio M. H.W. Bush 5 Minor 102 43 43 3 
Garza,  
Reynaldo G. Carter 5 Minor 96 73 73 
Gibbons,  
Julia S. W. Bush 6 Minor 107 293 293 2 
Gibson, 
 John R. Reagan 8 Minor 97 30 30 
Gilman,  
Ronald L. Clinton 6 Minor 105 113 113 1 
Gould,  
Ronald M. Clinton 9 Minor 106 295 739 105 2 
Graber,  
Susan Clinton 9 Minor 105 230 230 1 
Greenberg, 
Morton I. Reagan 3 Minor 100 37 37 
Gregory,  
Roger L. W. Bush 4 Minor 107 72 72 3 
Griffin,  




Thomas B. W. Bush D.C. Minor 109 120 400 108 4 
Gruender,  
Raymond W. W. Bush 8 Minor 108 234 234 3 
Guy,  
Ralph B., Jr. Reagan 6 Minor 99 85 85 
Hall,  
Peter W. W. Bush 2 Minor 108 198 198 1 
Hamilton,  
Clyde H. H.W. Bush 4 Minor 102 36 36 2 
Hansen,  
David R. H.W. Bush 8 Minor 102 138 138 1 
Hardiman, 
Thomas M. W. Bush 3 Minor 110 65 65 1 
Hartz, 
 Harris L. W. Bush 10 Minor 107 168 168 2 
Hatchett,  
Joseph W. Carter 5 Minor 96 56 56 
Hawkins,  
Michael D. Clinton 9 Minor 103 63 63 1 
Haynes,  
Catharina W. Bush 5 Minor 110 268 268 1 
Henderson, 
Albert J. Carter 5 Minor 96 85 85 
Henderson, 
Karen L. H.W. Bush D.C. Minor 101 51 51 1 
Henry, 
Robert H. Clinton 10 Minor 103 86 86 2 
Higginbotham, 
A. Leon, Jr. Carter 3 Minor 95 18 18 
Higginbotham, 
Patrick E. Reagan 5 Minor 97 26 26 
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Robert M. Reagan 5 Minor 98 11 11 
Holmes,  
Jerome A. W. Bush 10 Minor 109 82 82 3 
Howard,  
Jeffrey R. W. Bush 1 Minor 107 264 264 4 
Hug,  
Procter R., Jr. Carter 9 Minor 95 17 17 
Hull,  
Frank M. Clinton 11 Minor 105 78 78 1 
Hutchinson, 
William D. Reagan 3 Minor 100 40 40 
Johnson,  
Frank Minis, Jr. Carter 5 Minor 96 78 78 
Johnson,  
Samuel D., Jr. Carter 5 Minor 96 55 55 
Jolly,  
E. Grady Reagan 5 Minor 97 26 26 
Jones,  
Edith H. Reagan 5 Minor 99 35 198 98 
Jones,  
Nathaniel R. Carter 6 Minor 96 37 37 
Jordan,  
Kent A. W. Bush 3 Minor 109 163 163 1 
Kanne,  
Michael S. Reagan 7 Minor 100 106 106 
Keith,  
Damon J. Carter 6 Minor 95 22 22 
Kelly,  
John D. Clinton 8 Minor 105 185 185 3 
Kelly,  
Paul J., Jr. H.W. Bush 10 Minor 102 141 141 1 
Kennedy,  
Cornelia G. Carter 6 Minor 96 169 169 
Kethledge, 
Raymond M. W. Bush 6 Minor 110 97 727 2 
King,  
Carolyn D. Carter 5 Minor 96 73 73 
King,  
Robert B. Clinton 4 Minor 105 106 106 2 
Kleinfeld,  
Andrew J. H.W. Bush 9 Minor 102 112 112 4 
Kravitch, 
 Phyllis A. Carter 5 Minor 96 61 61 
Krupansky, 
Robert B. Reagan 6 Minor 97 35 35 
Leavy, 
 Edward Reagan 9 Minor 100 46 46 
Lewis,  
Timothy K. H.W. Bush 3 Minor 102 21 21 2 
Lipez,  
Kermit V. Clinton 1 Minor 105 164 164 2 
Logan, 
 James K. Carter 10 Minor 95 41 41 
Loken,  
James B. H.W. Bush 8 Minor 101 32 32 2 
Lourie,  
Alan D. H.W. Bush Fed. Minor 101 71 71 2 
Lucero,  
Carlos F. Clinton 10 Minor 104 99 99 1 
Lynch,  
Sandra L. Clinton 1 Minor 104 65 185 103 1 
Magill,  
Frank J. Reagan 8 Minor 99 41 41 
Manion,  
Daniel A. Reagan 7 Minor 99 125 125 
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Carol L. Reagan 3 Minor 99 27 27 
Marcus,  
Stanley Clinton 11 Minor 105 43 43 2 
Martin,  
Boyce F., Jr. Carter 6 Minor 96 112 112 
McConnell, 
Michael W. W. Bush 10 Minor 107 555 555 1 
McKay,  
Monroe G. Carter 10 Minor 95 27 27 
McKeague, 





Theodore A. Clinton 3 Minor 103 78 78 4 
McKeown,  
M. Margaret Clinton 9 Minor 105 56 728 104 1 
McLaughlin, 
Joseph M. H.W. Bush 2 Minor 101 94 94 1 
McMillian, 
Theodore Carter 8 Minor 95 50 50 
Melloy,  
Michael J. W. Bush 8 Minor 107 216 216 1 
Merritt,  
Gilbert S., Jr. Carter 6 Minor 95 65 65 
Michael,  
M. Blane Clinton 4 Minor 103 55 55 1 
Milburn,  
Herbert T. Reagan 6 Minor 98 27 27 
Miner,  
Roger J. Reagan 2 Minor 99 27 27 
Moore,  
Karen N. Clinton 6 Minor 104 59 191 103 2 
Motz,  
Diana J. G. Clinton 4 Minor 103 139 139 1 
Murnaghan, 
Francis D., Jr. Carter 4 Minor 96 65 65 
Murphy,  
Diana E. Clinton 8 Minor 103 71 71 1 
Murphy,  
Michael R. Clinton 10 Minor 104 17 17 1 
Neilson,  





David A. Reagan 6 Minor 99 37 37 
Nelson,  
Thomas G. H.W. Bush 9 Minor 101 86 86 2 
Newman,  
Jon O. Carter 2 Minor 96 50 50 
Niemeyer,  
Paul V. H.W. Bush 4 Minor 101 94 94 1 
Norris,  
Alan E. Reagan 6 Minor 99 45 45 
Nygaard,  
Richard L. Reagan 3 Minor 100 142 142 
O'Brien,  
Terrence L. W. Bush 10 Minor 107 256 256 2 
O'Scannlain, 
Diarmuid F. Reagan 9 Minor 99 45 45 
Owen, 





Fred I. Clinton 2 Minor 103 43 43 1 
Parker,  
Robert M. Clinton 5 Minor 103 139 139 2 
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James D., Jr. Carter 4 Minor 95 22 22 
Politz, 
 Henry A. Carter 5 Minor 96 70 70 
Pooler, 
 Rosemary S. Clinton 2 Minor 105 208 208 3 
Porfilio,  
John C. Reagan 10 Minor 99 28 28 
Prado,  
Edward C. W. Bush 5 Minor 108 84 84 1 
Pryor,  
William H., Jr. W. Bush 11 Minor 109 115 792 108 4 
Rader,  
Randall R. H.W. Bush Fed. Minor 101 52 52 3 
Randolph,  
Arthur R. H.W. Bush D.C. Minor 101 66 66 2 
Rawlinson, 
Johnnie B. Clinton 9 Minor 106 150 150 3 
Reavley,  
Thomas M. Carter 5 Minor 96 56 56 
Rendell,  
Marjorie O. Clinton 3 Minor 105 262 262 1 
Riley,  
William J. W. Bush 8 Minor 107 71 71 1 
Rogers,  
John M. W. Bush 6 Minor 107 330 330 3 
Roth,  
Jane R. H.W. Bush 3 Minor 102 42 42 2 
Rubin,  
Alvin B. Carter 5 Minor 95 31 31 
Ryan, 
 James L. Reagan 6 Minor 99 37 37 
Schroeder,  
Mary M. Carter 9 Minor 96 145 145 
Scirica,  
Anthony J. Reagan 3 Minor 100 40 40 
Selya,  
Bruce M. Reagan 1 Minor 99 12 12 
Sentelle,  
David B. Reagan D.C. Minor 100 219 219 
Seymour,  
Stephanie K. Carter 10 Minor 96 64 64 
Shedd,  
Dennis W. W. Bush 4 Minor 107 559 559 2 
Shepherd,  
Bobby E. W. Bush 8 Minor 109 63 63 1 
Siler,  
Eugene E., Jr. H.W. Bush 6 Minor 102 85 85 1 
Silverman,  
Barry G. Clinton 9 Minor 105 81 81 3 
Skopil,  
Otto R., Jr. Carter 9 Minor 96 103 103 
Sloviter,  
Dolores K. Carter 3 Minor 96 76 76 
Smith,  
D. Brooks W. Bush 3 Minor 107 324 324 1 
Smith,  
Jerry E. Reagan 5 Minor 100 200 200 
Smith,  
Lavenski R. W. Bush 8 Minor 107 417 417 3 
Smith,  
N. Randy W. Bush 9 Minor 110 30 426 1 
Souter,  
D. H.W. Bush 1 Minor 101 93 93 1 
Southwick, 
 Leslie W. Bush 5 Minor 110 288 288 1 
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 James M. Carter 4 Minor 96 68 68 
Stahl,  
Norman H. H.W. Bush 1 Minor 102 78 78 1 
Stapleton,  
Walter K. Reagan 3 Minor 99 7 7 
Stewart,  
Carl E. Clinton 5 Minor 103 99 99 2 
Suhrheinrich, 
Richard F. H.W. Bush 6 Minor 101 71 71 4 
Sutton,  
Jeffrey S. W. Bush 6 Minor 108 112 720 107 2 
Sykes,  
Diane S. W. Bush 7 Minor 108 223 223 2 
Tacha,  
Deanell R. Reagan 10 Minor 99 46 46 
Tallman, 
 Richard C. Clinton 9 Minor 106 217 217 2 
Tang,  
Thomas Carter 9 Minor 95 39 39 
Tate,  
Albert, Jr. Carter 5 Minor 96 65 65 
Thomas,  
Sidney R. Clinton 9 Minor 104 167 167 1 
Thompson, 
David R. Reagan 9 Minor 99 70 70 
Tinder,  
John D. W. Bush 7 Minor 110 154 154 1 
Torruella,  
Juan R. Reagan 1 Minor 98 63 63 
Traxler,  
William B., Jr. Clinton 4 Minor 105 80 80 1 
Tymkovich, 
Timothy M. W. Bush 10 Minor 108 84 574 107 4 
Van Antwerpen, 
Franklin S. W. Bush 3 Minor 108 181 181 1 
Vance,  
Robert S. Carter 5 Minor 95 41 41 
Wellford,  
Harry W. Reagan 6 Minor 97 24 24 
Wesley,  
Richard C. W. Bush 2 Minor 108 98 98 1 
White,  
Helene N. W. Bush 6 Minor 110 70 70 2 
Wiener,  
Jacques L., Jr. H.W. Bush 5 Minor 101 112 620 100 1 
Wilkins,  
William W. Reagan 4 Minor 99 10 10 
Wilkinson, 
James H., III Reagan 4 Minor 98 272 272 
Williams,  
Jerre Stockton Carter 5 Minor 96 65 65 
Williams,  
Karen J. H.W. Bush 4 Minor 102 31 31 2 
Williams, 
 Stephen F. Reagan D.C. Minor 99 114 114 
Wilson,  
Charles R. Clinton 11 Minor 106 64 64 2 
Winter,  
Ralph K., Jr. Reagan 2 Minor 97 21 21 
Wollman,  
Roger L.  Reagan 8 Minor 99 24 24 
                                                                                           Average Days: 104.03111 154.5867 
 
